A recent Opinion Piece on Al Jazeera titled Which Philosophy is Dead? by Santiago Zabla and Creston Davis reminded me that I had written this talk about eighteen months ago when invited to deliver a Royal Institute of Philosophy talk at St Mary's University College, London. (I subsequently presented the talk at the Russian Presidential Academy, Moscow.) So, I thought I might as well reproduce it here, for those who might be interested. It was written for a general audience so I would hope that its interest is not limited to philosophers. Indeed, the implicit point is really that a society without philosophy might well be impoverished in important ways, but I don't really here argue that point. I have a plan to expand it and include it as part of a larger series of writings (maybe a book) on the same topic.
What Have the Philosophers ever Done For Us?
Well, I guess we could look at this question in a number of ways.
We could interpret it as a straight question and go about compiling a list of
those distinctively philosophical things that philosophers have bequeathed to
the world. I haven’t myself given much thought to what might be on such a list.
Indeed, it will become apparent as I progress that providing such a list would
be difficult, not because philosophers have made no genuine positive
contribution to societies, but rather because of the nature of genuinely
philosophical contributions.
We could, with an eye to the
question that my title paraphrases, see it as a rhetorical question, designed
to lead all who hear it to believe that philosophers have done nothing. This
is, of course, what the character played by John Cleese is doing as he utters
the words I here paraphrase in Monty Python’s Life of Brian. For those who
are unfamiliar with the scene, Cleese is playing Reg, the leader of the Judean
Peoples’ Front (or is it the Peoples’ Front of Judea?) and at the start of a
meeting he ‘asks’ the question “What have the Romans ever done for us”. He asks
the question because he believes that his audience and fellow-members of the
Judean People’s front will see that it is self-evident that the answer is a
resounding ‘nothing’!
As those who know the scene will
recall, Reg is disappointed: For, members of his audience miss the rhetorical idiom,
and progress to respond by listing a number of significant things that the
Romans had done for the people of
Judea.
Of course, Reg asked the wrong
question. The Romans might well have built a sewerage system, aquaducts, and
brought law and order to the streets of Jerusalem, but that hardly justifies an
armed occupation, political oppression and regular mass crucifixions.
But I digress.
No. My title is there not as a
question expecting an answer. Nor as my own attempt at a rhetorical question,
meant to highlight that philosophers have done nothing (as Reg thought of the
Romans in Judea) or something (as it turns out his audience believed). Rather,
the question is there because this last year has led me to believe that when it
comes to philosophers (a group of which I am a member) there are a lot of Regs
in prominent positions in the natural sciences: people for whom asking the
question ‘what have the philosophers ever done for us?’ would serve a clear
rhetorical role.
I will name three here and now.
Peter Atkins (Professor Emeritus
of Chemistry at Oxford and author of over 60 books),
Stephen Hawking (The world’s most
famous theoretical physicist), and
UCL’s professor Emeritus of
Pharmacology and author of the DCScience blog, David Colquhoun.
None of the three would object to
my naming them, I am sure. All have sought to dismiss philosophy and
philosophers very publicly:
Atkins in
his most recent mass market book, On
Being, in a filmed public debate with the philosopher Stephen Law (at the
Oxford Think festival, broadcast on YouTube), and also in a brief appearance on
the Today programme (17/03/11) debating with Mary Midgely (who put in a poor performance,
unfortunately).
Colquhoun has many blog entries which are disparaging about philosophers and their
unhelpfulness. And he names names: John Worrall, Nancy
Cartwright and my colleague at MMU, Michael Loughlin. (on whom, more later).
Finally, Hawking opens his latest book, The Grand Design, by writing:
Finally, Hawking opens his latest book, The Grand Design, by writing:
“people have
always asked a multitude of questions: How can we understand the world in which
we find ourselves? How does the universe behave? What is the nature of reality?
Where did all this come from? Did the universe need a creator?
[…]
Traditionally
these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not
kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics. Scientists
have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge.”
Let’s think about this passage. There’s
a strong clue at the end as to why we might be well advised in not taking Hawking
to be a writer with the requisite authority to make such an announcement regarding
the discipline of philosophy and its current status.
Now, to be clear, I am not concerned
to challenge his work as a physicist, though I am told by those who are
qualified in the area that Hawking’s favoured theory: m-theory (Model-dependent
realism) is a little more indebted to assumptions of a philosophical variety
than Hawking is ready to acknowledge. But, as I said, this is not my concern
and not something that right now I feel qualified or inclined to form a
judgement on.
So, back to the passage just
quoted. There are problems that are worth addressing here, by way of framing
what I want to say in what follows. There are two related points I want to
make. First Hawking makes a move, or rather, a leap from his list of questions that
he takes to have been traditionally addressed by philosophers but that he now
claims are best dealt with by scientists to the conclusion that philosophy as a
discipline is dead. The conclusion is, quite obviously, not warranted by the
premises alone. For even were one to agree with Hawking that these questions
now fall squarely within the domain of theoretical physics and not philosophy,
that hardly logically forces upon one the conclusion that the discipline of
philosophy is dead. Philosophers do many other things.
Onto the second point. This
emerges from our paying attention to the wording of the final sentence of the
quote. To repeat that sentence: (Hawking:) “Scientists have become the bearers
of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge.”
Hawking, one might say, is a
little like the Knight, Antonius Block, at the beginning (and crucially not at
the middle or the end) of Ingmar Bergman’s film the Seventh Seal, believing that all questions are epistemological
questions: that is, that knowledge of more facts will settle each and every
question. Block, of course, as the film progresses comes to understand that the
question of life’s meaning is not one that will be settled by looking for
facts. He realises he is looking in the wrong place, that his initial
assumptions about the sort of question he was asking was at fault.
My reading of the film, for those
who are interested, is that it follows a loose dialectical structure, whereby
Block progresses from assuming the question to be purely epistemological, to
seeing it as a question of understanding, to realising that it is rather not so
much a question, a problem of the intellect, as quest, in the sense of being an
existential journey. That is to say, the question as to whether life or the
universe has meaning is not settled by availing oneself of some set of facts,
nor of achieving understanding. Rather it is settled, so much as it can ever be
so settled, through the recognition that what one might assume to be the
question to be answered is actually a quest to be undertaken, the culmination
of which will be that one’s life has meaning when that life is lived in
accordance with the ordinary virtues. I digress again.
To return to Hawking, and the
passage quoted above. In short, what we see is that Hawking’s claim contains
assumptions. It assumes that all questions are epistemological and that
philosophy, therefore, is a primitive—that is to say, primitive relevant to the
mature natural sciences—attempt to answer those
questions.
Disciplining the Stroppy Teenagers
What I am trying to bring to the
fore is the sense in which such an assumption implies that philosophers have
nothing of genuine worth to contribute where a domain of inquiry that is of
philosophical interest to them has progressed to a mature state. On this view,
philosophers have existed to fill a hole left by our progression from ignorance
to enlightenment. Where a domain of scientific inquiry is still too immature
and yet our culture has evolved to treat religious world-views and divine
metaphysics with a healthy scepticism, philosophy plays an interim role. Philosophers
are the awkward adolescents, the stroppy teenagers, to the scientists’ mature
adult and the theologian’s child that is prone to tantrum.
Once a science is mature,
philosophical enquiry loses its worth. Indeed, once a science is considered
mature, philosophical interference is seen as an irritant. More later…
Now, there are many ways
philosophers might respond to these attacks. Christopher Norris has written a
short but rather powerful piece, published in Philosophy Now, where he takes Hawking to task. I don’t agree with
some of the details—such as his depiction of Kuhn as a relativist or philosophy
of science having progressed over the past couple of decades by becoming more
Realist (with a capital R)—but the general tenor of his critique is pretty much
spot on, in my view. He takes the approach that I have endorsed here, of
questioning Hawking’s own understanding of the discipline that he pronounces
dead. Similarly, I have already mentioned in passing Stephen Law’s debate with Peter Atkins, which is available to watch on YouTube. This debate is notable for
Atkins’ rather shameless and somewhat thinly veiled rhetorical moves, employed in an
attempt to shut down or re-orientate the debate when he is clearly floundering.
(Check-out part three of the six-part discussion; particularly see about 5 mins
in, and precisely 6:04, for Atkins simply insisting on changing the subject when he
clearly should (in combat-sport parlance…) be submitting)
So, there it is. Philosophers,
the awkward adolescents and the stroppy teenagers, should grow up and do
science or, if they insist on holding onto their awkwardness, they should keep
out of the important work scientists are now doing.
Now, of course, the developmental
metaphors I am choosing to employ are not used entirely seriously, but they are
not employed merely to make mischief. That is to say, these developmental
metaphors—the talk of stroppy teenagers and the like—don’t introduce an angle
to this debate which was not hitherto there. I say this with an eye to David
Colquhoun’s various contributions to the debate.
Colquhoun is forthright. But he
is also indiscriminate. For Colquhoun, the world is formed into two camps: in
the one camp are the postmodernists and proponents of complimentary and
alternative medicine (CAM) and in the other camp are the Scientists and
advocates of Evidence-Based Medicine. This causes a problem for anyone who is
neither a proponent of CAM nor a postmodernist on the one hand, but who does
want to ask some questions about the philosophical assumptions in play in EBM
and the consequences of those assumptions. The problem is that for Colquhoun, in
a manner that makes it tempting to engage in some psychoanalysis, there simply
are only these two camps. If you criticise a prominent proponent of EBM, defend
a critic of EBM, or seek to uncover philosophical assumptions in the
foundations of the EBM movement, then you are a postmodernist and most likely
an advocate of CAM.
Now, I am sure this might sound
like I am simplifying things here, maybe even to the extent that I am setting
up a straw man. However, I will reproduce for you here an exchange between David
Colquhoun and me on his blog, www.DCScience.org, from November 2010. You can
draw your own conclusions.
The context for this dialogue is
a blog posting of Colquhoun’s in which he described the philosopher (and MMU
colleague of mine) as a hater of Ben Goldacre and a Post Modernist theorist. The exchange took place in the comments below the blog entry. Following this exchange Colquhoun did amend his blog so that Loughlin was depicted--though still inaccurately--as
“Post-Modernist-influenced”, though still a hater of Ben Goldacre.
So, I begin with my opening
contribution (Colquhoun's replies are italicised). I here quote myself.
inlightoftheevidence // Nov 15, 2010 at 11:41
Prof. DC.
I know evidence is important to you, and I share that commitment. So, I am somewhat surprised to see Michael Loughlin referred to as a “Post-Modern Theorist”. The evidence demonstrates otherwise.
Have you read a single publication by Loughlin? I am sure you must have, given your commitment to evidence; so I’d be grateful if you might point us to evidence for Loughlin’s alleged Post-Modernist credentials.
Only, I have read quite a bit of Loughlin’s work, since he was first referred to by you here, and I find that rather than being an anti-science, anti-evidence post-modernist theorist he is quite the contrary. He is a philosopher who has published many damning criticisms of post-modernism, in various contexts (including Health). Moreover, his own views seem to be more than respectful of evidence. He is clearly a realist, (in philosophical parlance), who meets those who propound antirealist and relativist views with a healthy dose of scepticism. This scepticism has led him to engage very critically and in some detail with anti-realists and relativists in many articles published in peer reviewed journals, and in his book (many of those he engages with might be legitimately characterised as post-modern theorists).
So, I put it to you that the evidence suggests that Loughlin is not a post modernist.
Regarding his alleged ‘hatred’ of Ben Goldacre, again I’m somewhat surprised at your line here.
Loughlin seems to be wanting to ask one thing of the EBM movement: what is your account of evidence? We can all employ the word evidence, but unless we’re clear as to what it is that counts as evidence then our employment of that term becomes empty and simply rhetorical. Loughlin makes this request as someone whose own philosophical predilections and beliefs (which is clear if you read his work) are such that he clearly has no problem with the demand of medicine being evidence-based (or any other domain of enquiry).
But, of course, here is the problem: Unless we clarify what we mean by evidence, then we’re simply employing the term as a buzzword.
12 David Colquhoun // Nov 15, 2010 at 13:05
@inlightoftheevidence
Thanks for that comment. Yes, i have read several of Loughlin’s articles, thanks largely to my long correspondence with Andrew Miles.
Perhaps I should have said “post-modernist influenced”. Certainly Loughlin rushed to the defence of an out-and-out postmodernist article which Goldacre (and also I) had dissected. The quotation from Loughlin at http://www.dcscience.net/?p=2881 seems to me, on its own, quite enough to preclude his views from being taken seriously in discussions of health matters.
I’ll confess that I find his views, and those of Miles, quite hard to understand. They seem to be a mixture of libertarianism and post-modernist influence, that is not really very helpful.
The matter of what constitutes evidence is, of course, crucial but I don’t think that philosophers have made much contribution to that discussion. Certainly I find statisticians far more useful. RA fisher, Bradford Hill and their successors have defined rather well what we mean by ‘evidence’. In contrast, most working scientists are unaware of the arguments that go on between philosophers, and I’m not convinced they are missing much. Only too often, in a vain attempt to improve on what Fisher taught us about randomisation in the 1930s, they promulgate ideas that would actually harm progress if anyone took any notice of them. Luckily, they don’t.
13 inlightoftheevidence // Nov 16, 2010 at 14:17
Thanks very much for taking the time to reply David.
Is your correspondence with Miles published, or available in full anywhere?
Just to re-iterate. I see no evidence for Loughlin being either a post-modernist theorist or influenced by post-modernism. His published work clearly demonstrates that he is very critical of post-modern arguments. In addition, when he advances his own views these are clearly views that would be antithetical to those with post-modern predilections.
I must confess to being rather surprised at your own predilection for ad hominem attacks, given your expressed commitment to evidence. However, that aside maybe we could clarify a few things (please bear with me here):
Derrida was a post-modernist par excellence, we might say. Now, I believe his theory of meaning and Deconstruction in general to be demonstrably and irretrievably flawed. However, at the same time, I would argue that the criticisms of Derrida advanced by the American philosopher John Searle miss the mark and are based in willful misunderstandings of Derrida’s writings (this is not necessarily _my_ view, but it is a sustainable position to take and one taken by many). If I am to argue this, would it thereby follow that I am influenced by Derrida or post-modernism? Of course not. I would simply be concerned that one’s identification of flaws in Derrida’s theories not serve as illegitimate justification for the belief that any and all dismissals of Derrida are correct.
Put another way, however poor argument ‘x’ is that fails to justify invalid argument advanced by those who set out to criticise argument ‘x’.
Loughlin’s defence of that paper is clearly based in a belief that the critics were advancing poor arguments. It does not follow (and is simply factually incorrect to say) that he thereby is a post-modern theorist or is influenced by post-modernism.
This is a stance taken by the rational. It is a stance I would expect from those who genuinely respect science and evidence.
But this isn’t the real issue here, is it? As someone expressly committed to evidence (as am I) I think you weaken your own position by engaging in this sort of indiscriminate mud-slinging. Let’s resist the attaching of labels to people and engage in a rigorous but fair manner with their arguments. Or is it your view that libertarians and post-modernists (and those influenced by them) should be dismissed before being heard?
14 David Colquhoun // Nov 16, 2010 at 15:36
@inlightoftheevidence
Postmodernists have been heard. Their absurd pretensions were demolished once and for all by the superb work of Alan Sokal. Apart from his wonderful book (part of the header picture on this blog. i recommend strongly his essay Pseudoscience and Postmodernism: Antagonists or Fellow-Travelers?In the case of Loughlin, anybody who writes as he does about Goldacre isn’t worthy of serious consideration in my view.
Returning to the subject of this post. perhaps you can explain why he should choose to ally himself with the anti-scientific quacks that form the backbone of the “College of Medicine”. I certainly can’t explain it.* [on this specific point, see my comment at the end of this quoted text]
15 inlightoftheevidence // Nov 16, 2010 at 16:21
Hi again David (if I may).
Of course, it serves your interests to ignore the points I put to you about your factually inaccurate depiction of Loughlin, your tendency to ad hominem attack and your tendency to sloppy reasoning (e.g. Loughlin criticises someone who is criticising post-modernism, therefore he must be a post modernist (despite evidence to the contrary)). But I, naively maybe, hoped for and expected more from you.
I have been explicit and clear that I have no interest in defending post-modernism. Indeed, in addition to the work you link to immediately above [Sokal], I could give you my own detailed criticisms of some of the central tenets of post modernism. But, once again, this is beside the point. Indeed, why I asked in my original posting if you had read Loughlin was because he approvingly cites Sokal when he advances his own criticisms of post-modernism. You must have missed this.
You say:
“In the case of Loughlin, anybody who writes as he does about Goldacre isn’t worthy of serious consideration in my view.”
You realise how this comes across, right? This is base tribalism. It doesn’t even gesture in the direction of rational debate. Are the words of Ben Goldacre simply beyond criticism? If so, are they so in principle? I ask this as someone who admires Goldacre’s work, admired and enjoyed his book [Bad Science], and recommend it to many people. [However,] he is not beyond reproach. No one should be.
Your final paragraph. Why not write to Loughlin and ask him (rather than surmising and then posting those speculations on your blog as if they were facts)? I suspect he will answer that he has not “allied himself” with these people. One is not automatically allied to the views of one’s colleagues, simply in virtue of them being colleagues; nor is one allied to the views of a journal editor, in virtue of having published in their journal.
16 David Colquhoun // Nov 16, 2010 at 18:59
@inlightoftheevidence
I dispute your comment about tribalism. It is much simpler than that. I simply agree with Goldacre and find Loughlin’s comments quite offensive. The context was Loughlin’s reaction to Goldacre’s comment on a paper by Holmes et al. with the title “Deconstructing the evidence-based discourse in health sciences: truth, power and fascism” [download reprint]. Of this paper, Goldacre said
“Even from looking at the title, you just know this academic paper from the September edition of the International Journal of Evidence-based Healthcare is going to be an absolute corker. And it uses the word “fascist” (or elaborate derivatives) 28 times in six pages, . . .”.
My own comments were rather less flattering. The paper is post-modernist through and through and Loughlin leapt to its defence, hence my comment. Perhaps it would help if you were to tell us your own opinion about Holmes et al.
it was here that I called it a day.
[*] Now, it is worth noting here, in light of his penchant
for ascribing guilt by association and despite my having tried to demonstrate
the flaws in such a strategy, that Colquhoun was a member of the Conduct and Competence Committee of the Complementary and Natural Healthcare Council (CNHC), a
regulatory body for alternative medicine in the UK. Colquhoun is on record as
saying he was surprised at being accepted for the position. And he was,
unsurprisingly, dismissed in August 2010. However, the point I wish to make is
simply this: while Loughlin is dammed for associating with the “College of
Medicine”, by being listed as a visiting Prof at the University of Buckingham,
and by publishing in a journal edited by Andrew Miles, David Colquhoun is not
to be judged by his association with the Conduct and Competence Committee of
the Complementary and Natural Healthcare Council. It is obviously right that
Colquhoun’s membership of this Committee is not leaped upon and misused as
(pseudo-)evidence for his closet support of CAM.
Nevertheless, this point of consistency aside, one might respond
to this dialogue between Colquhoun and me in a number of ways. Here are three:
- One might ask, why does it matter?
- One might dismiss the three scientists we’ve here discussed as unrepresentative of science in general. And
- One might, I guess, agree with one or more of them.
Well, in reverse order: (3) I don’t agree with them, as I’ve outlined. (2) I am not sure whether they are representative, but I do not think that question is too important, given what my answer is to the first of these three questions (1): to reiterate, that question was “why does it matter (what Colquhoun, Atkins, and Hawking believe)?”
Well, it matters because science is important, it matters
because policy decisions are made and eminent scientists have influence both
directly—in virtue of sitting on policy committees—and indirectly—through their
prominence in the mainstream media. David Colquhoun has clout. Therefore, his penchant
for ad hominem and ascribing guilt by association should not be left unchecked
and unchallenged.
Let us think of Colquhoun’s beloved Evidence Based Medicine
(you thought I was going to say Ben Goldacre then, didn’t you?). Now, as I said,
I am not a physicist, though there have been plenty of philosophers who were; I'll also acknowledge that I am not a statistician, though, again, there are philosophers who are. You see, one might say that philosophy is a broad church, but even that can be a misleading way of putting things. Philosophers often disagree to an extent which makes it simply inaccurate to employ the church metaphor, however broad one goes on to claim the church to be. However, as a philosopher,
I am happy to here state that I am broadly supportive of the EBM movement, its
aims and achievements. Indeed, I confess that I am a fan of Goldacre’s work (and his Twitter feed), as
I wrote on David Colquhoun’s blog. However, EBM as a movement does contain
philosophical assumptions and these do have consequences that reach beyond the
appraisal of medicine and the narrowly defined practice of diagnosis and
treatment of medical conditions.
The methods which are appropriate in one domain of scientific inquiry are not necessarily appropriate in another domain. Science, like philosophy, is not a coherent sphere of activity, which is united by the employment of a particular method. Yet this is precisely what that other prominent public face of science, Professor Brian Cox, assumes when he writes about the scientific method, as if there is one method employed by all the natural sciences. (Indeed, this idea is problematic before we even begin considering those areas of inquiry outside the natural sciences.) Claims such as Cox's regarding the scientific method can strike anyone with a passing knowledge of the history and philosophy of science as a little naive (as commented by Rebekah Higgitt here), but such assumptions abound. And Goldacre’s deservedly successful and applauded
book, Bad Science, is replete with
the consequences of these seemingly unacknowledged philosophical assumptions. His recent application of the methods of EBM to education/teaching might be another area where the assumptions hold back the desire to be truly evidence based. There are discussions and arguments to be had, and these discussions should be welcomed by anyone for whom evidence is important. Philosophers can contribute much to such discussions. Assumptions need bringing to consciousness because only then can they be addressed and appraised. If assumptions remain subterranean (as it were) then they act simply as constraints.
Pronouncing on the death of philosophy shows ignorance of the ways in which philosophy can play an important role in important matters, because it shows ignorance of philosophy (and therefore of science, as evidenced in the case of Prof. Brian Cox)
So, by way of moving toward conclusion I want to make two
claims.
1. Pronouncements
on the death of philosophy are based in a misunderstanding of the discipline. They
assume it to be a protoscience. This is to betray ignorance of philosophy.
Socrates was not a protoscientist. To be sure, Aristotle had his
protoscientific moments which were about as successful from our vantage point as any 2500 year old science. Similarly,
Jerry Fodor has his—far more prevalent—moments also, the success on which I am
happy to allow the reader to make their own decision. But for every Aristotle and
for every Jerry Fodor, there is a Socrates or a Wittgenstein: a philosopher for
whom identifying how the discipline of philosophy has a distinct identity,
irreducible to the natural sciences, to logic, to psychology and to
mathematics, was crucial. (This was an obsession for Wittgenstein). What is
crucial for such thinkers is the exposing or the combatting of Sophistry.
Wittgenstein thought philosophical therapy the way. Socrates thought dialogue
and reason.
2. Scientists are
no more immune to the temptation, or the unwitting propensity to, spontaneous
philosophising than anyone else. Scientists are just as likely to be held in
thrall to an underlying philosophical picture of the way the world must be as
is any one. The only thing that works as a prophylactic to such a tendency is
the appropriate philosophical training.
Reading something so beautiful has a healing power for the soul.Joseph Hayon
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